When I first wrote this blog post, it was not that long ago; but it was in the time before Roe v Wade was discarded by a majority of Supreme Court justices and the onslaught of legislative and legal action targeting abortion, education, same-sex relations, and the trans community. In the words of activists in this cause, they are engaged in “spiritual and political warfare.” So, yes, the situation has deteriorated further, much further, prompting this new look at what is going on.
Significantly, the alarm over these developments is being voiced even by clergy and church leaders. In his recent book (Losing Our Religion), Russell Moore, former Southern Baptist pastor and now editor-in-chief of Christianity Today characterizes the situation as a crisis in Evangelical Christianity. The Rev. Matthew Harrison, president of the Lutheran Church – Missouri Synod, recently expressed his horror at the extremist effort to take over the conservative Lutheran denomination, rebuking the “horrible and racist teachings of the so-called ‘alt-right,’” with such ideologies as “white supremacy, Nazism, pro-slavery, anti-interracial marriage, women as property, fascism, death for homosexuals, even genocide” (https://religionnews.com/2023/02/22/lutheran-church-missouri-synod-president-calls-for-excommunicating-white-nationalists/).
What makes this movement so dangerous is that it positions itself as occupying the moral high ground. That serves to attract followers at the same time as it allows them to paint their opponents as immoral, irreligious, or godless—sometimes even as demons out to take away freedoms, constitutional rights, and the American way of life. In reality, however, what is going on has almost nothing to do with morality or religion or freedom, but misconceptions, distortions, and manipulations of them.
Maintaining clarity on these and related points is crucial because such misunderstanding and deception are hastening the collapse of any common moral compass, which our founders rightly believed is so critical for sustaining our nation and its experiment in self-government. Clarity, however, will not be gained by slogans or simple appeals to the principle of separation of church and state, but a careful look at how distortions are being used to create a toxic mix that is ultimately wreaking havoc on morality, religion, and politics and threatening our experiment in self-government. My hope is that my analysis will contribute to clarity and a way forward.
Over the course of this five-part essay, I will explore (1) the essential properties of morality, (2) the ways it gets derailed, (3) the positive and negative ways it is affected by religion, (4) the current toxic mixture of religion, politics, and religion, and (5) the prospects for a less toxic future. (Note: Since the topic involves some complex components that need clarification to see how they are being distorted and misused in creating a toxic mix, my analysis is unavoidably quite lengthy. I thus will publish the piece as two blog entries, with Part One for Sections I, II, and III and Part Two for Sections IV and V.)
Section I: The Essentials of Morality
Morality and the moral point of view arise because of incontrovertible facts about the human condition: we are social beings who (1) need to rely on each other because no one is self-sufficient, and (2) find ourselves vulnerable to harm from other human beings and the whims of fortune. Our interactions with each other have consequences. On the one hand, then, these interactions must be constrained to preserve mutual safety; and on the other hand, interactions that involve compassion, kindness, generosity, and so forth need to be nurtured to ensure cooperation and mutual aid. Morality fundamentally arises, then, in reference to others. No one would choose to live in a society without these basic moral underpinnings, for otherwise life would be infernal, subject to rampant victimization by the more powerful and the lack of mutual assistance. Everyone personally benefits from the morality of others.
This proto-moral impulse is engendered in experiences one has a child where moral behavior is normally present and where empathy and care are modeled by parents in their relationships to their children and other family members. Overall, the impetus toward acceptance of the rightness of these behaviors is promoted by recognition of the beneficial results. These behavioral guidelines set a standard for human decency.
But there is a significant additional step to morality that makes it obligatory. Viewed more formally from the moral point of view, the actual obligation to observe such guidelines is grounded in a recognition that at a basic level, all human beings are equally deserving of respect, not just those in our immediate family or community. They all share the kind of dignity “that is the basis for (1) the obligation all of us have not to kill them, (2) the obligation to take their well-being into account when we act, and (3) even the obligation to treat them as we would have them treat us” (https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/human_dignity/chapter16.html).
Such dignity is most often seen to be based in our shared capacity to reason and make choices. In any case, the moral domain has to do with certain behaviors that are in the final analysis freely chosen for moral reasons, that is, chosen because they are the right thing to do. Through moral reasoning, an agent appeals to a standard or standards arrived at independently of his or her narrow self-interests, desires, or preferences.
A closer look at morality reveals two aspects to it. The part of morality that prohibits the abuse of others is what I call morality in the narrow sense. It is a matter of right or wrong action. It is rule-based. It prohibits actions like murder, rape, theft, deception, and cruelty. It allows for only narrow exceptions such as may occur in cases of self-defense. Many offenses against this sense of morality are prohibited by law in the interests of public safety. But acting to avoid punishment is not acting for moral reasons.
The second aspect of morality concerns virtues or actions which actively aid others or help make their lives or the world better. This is what I call morality in the broad sense. Such morality is generally not a matter of right or wrong, but a matter of what is worthwhile, what is better, rather than worse, to do. Acts of generosity, compassion, or kindness, for example, are better than simply ignoring someone in need; but morality does not actually require these actions on every occasion the opportunity arises. The unrestrained practice of these virtues will leave no time or resources for oneself, leaving no one better off. We all have different strengths and are likely to practice some virtues more than others. That said, the more one practices such behaviors, the more morally praiseworthy one’s life is.
Although morality arises primarily in reference to others, morality also includes self-regarding behaviors. Cultivating virtues such as resilience, perseverance, or integrity, for example, helps an individual to flourish. Even so, such virtues can be said to have other-regarding aspects also in that they position the individual to be better able to make positive contributions to society.
This account of the essentials of the moral dimension is strikingly at odds with current discourse about morality, which is focused on hot-button items like abortion, same-sex relations, and transgender identities.
Two additional observations should be noted before concluding this section. First, it must be obvious to the reader that this account of the essentials of the moral dimension is strikingly at odds with current discourse about morality, which is focused on hot-button items like abortion, same-sex relations, and transgender identities, items that so often are made to look like the very essence of a moral issue. As we shall see in subsequent sections, however, there are good reasons for not including such issues here.
Second, my focus has so far been on actions that directly affect others as recipients of the actions of others. That leaves out of the discussion of the morality of situations wherein others are indirectly affected by the action of individuals or by their collective policy decisions. Both of these issues will be addressed in the next section.
Section II: Morality Derailed
Some paths to derailment are familiar to all of us. For example, we may know what the right thing to do is, but as agents we are overcome by our passions and weakness of will. Or we cut corners, telling ourselves on some occasions that doing something in conflict with morality is only a small matter and just an exception to our generally moral selves. Some of us are regularly quick to indulge immediate self-interest without thinking about the effects of our actions, or, worse, purposefully act to gain something for ourselves at the expense of others in situations where it is likely we can get away with it. Consciously or not, human beings can be their own worst enemies in matters of virtue. On the other hand, agents sometimes simply lack sufficient mental or other resources to make consistently good moral choices, in which cases help from others is needed.
This is not the end of the story, however. There are other derailment paths that are frequently unacknowledged, but have serious consequences. Although the obligations to behave morally are more stringent towards our immediate families and neighbors, the sad historical reality is that the notion of community to whom we have moral obligations is often not extended to those who act, speak, believe, or look differently from us. History is replete with examples of members of one community or nation individually and collectively, directly and indirectly, perpetrating or being complicit with abuse of those in other communities, including exploitation of those in other countries for economic or other gain: Slaves, Jews in World War II Germany and elsewhere, indigenous peoples almost everywhere, immigrants, Uyghurs in China, white trash, heretics, ethnic or religious minorities—examples could fill many pages. There exists almost no group in the world that has not been so abused at some point in their history, but perpetrators do not regard such action as immoral.
It is true that certain historical practices like slavery and the Holocaust are now generally viewed as immoral. It is important to note, however, that this does not indicate that morality itself changed or that it is relative to time or place. What is at issue is moral blindness, or the failure to the use the moral dimension in assessing cultural, social, and political practices. Even if our ancestors believed that slavery was morally acceptable or just failed to consider its practice in light of morality, slavery was no less immoral in the 18th century than it is now.
The moral point of view does require us as citizens and our political representatives to make a good faith effort to aim for the good of all and address inequities and abuses to the extent possible.
Sadly however, justifications for actions that negatively target certain groups, seem commonplace. Targeted groups are variously deemed less human and inferior, a threat to the community’s way of life, not meritorious enough, unclean, religiously wayward—this list, too, could go on and on. Sometimes no justification is felt to be needed. Such action is just accepted as a cultural norm or part of a system, for which no particular individual has any responsibility to question or alleviate. And let’s face it. These practices hurt some, but place others in a position of power and plays to the prejudices of the majority, making change or standing up for change no easy task.
On the other hand, figuring out what collective policies and actions are effective and beneficial is admittedly a complex, messy, and ongoing task. Even the best-intentioned policies can have negative unintended consequences. Nevertheless, the moral point of view does require us as citizens and our political representatives to make a good faith effort to aim for the good of all and address inequities and abuses to the extent possible. In this way and with the guidelines discussed in Section I, the moral dimension should inform policy decisions, our politics, our politicians, and our system of education.
Surprisingly enough, or perhaps not surprisingly, the moral considerations raised above and in Section I do not seem to figure much at all in the current political discussions about morality, or they are even being downplayed or opposed as the workings of being “woke.” The saddest part of this is that the issues getting the most attention in our country at the moment will not make us more moral as individuals or as a nation. In Sections III and IV, we will see why this is the case.
Section III: The Relationship of Religion to Morality
This relationship is often misconstrued in the popular imagination. That is, morality is frequently thought or assumed to be dependent on religion. This dependency has been characterized in different ways; but most commonly it is believed that a moral code only originates with religion (or God) or that without religion people will not be motivated to be moral.
In Sections I and II, we sketched out the essentials of the moral dimension; and at no point was there any need to refer to religion. And rightly so. The development of a moral code needs to be based on principles that derive from reason as applied to what is right or fit or promotes flourishing for social beings who lack self-sufficiency and who are vulnerable to disease, misfortunate, and the abuse of others. It is a task for all of us as members of the human race, regardless of any or no religious affiliation.
Nor is true that only religious individuals, or individuals who believe in God or organized religion, are moral, despite popular opinion to the contrary. Believers are not necessarily moral. Certainly, we have all experienced hypocrisy among believers, and sadly we have become all too aware of professed religionists, even ministers and clergy, sexually abusing children. Further, although data is hard to come by and can be inconclusive, evidence is lacking to decide whether believers or non-believers are on average more moral. In any case, individuals can act morally without being motivated by religious beliefs, hope of eternal reward, fear of everlasting punishment, or gratitude toward God. (https://theconversation.com/are-religious-people-more-moral-84560#:~:text=This%20finding%20has%20now%20been,likely%20believe)%20that%20they%20do).
However, while morality does not owe its existence to or derive from religion, religion can be its strong ally. As the comparative religion scholar Karen Armstrong has pointed out, compassion is the essential message of religion, embracing the good of empathy and acting towards others as we would want them to act toward us (see e.g., her “Charter for Compassion” (https://charterforcompsssion.org/charter)). The golden rule, mutual respect, and compassion, she argues, are embraced by religion; they are goods that make it possible for human beings to flourish as social beings. Religion’s central thrust, then, promotes what we have previously characterized as the essentials of the moral dimension.
While morality does not owe its existence to or derive from religion, religion can be its strong ally.
Moreover, certain religious beliefs such as we are all children of God or there is that of God in all of us, or concepts like the brotherhood of mankind and equality of all before God, profoundly reinforce the principle of respect for (all) others, the foundation stone of moral obligation. Then too, religions at their best tend to help their followers focus on what has enduring value as opposed to immediate self-gratification, encouraging them to look at things through the eyes of God as a moral exemplar, serve a purpose larger than themselves, and practice virtues that make them able to become productive, contributing members of their community and society.
On the other hand, religions can undermine clarity about the moral dimension and its universalism. They often provide their flocks with do’s and don’ts about a whole host of things like dress, diet, or worship. And very frequently they specify a host of rules for matters below the waist, sometimes dubbed “pelvic theology,” including permissible gender roles and sexual practices and relations. Sometimes these strictures are adopted from the cultural mores of the time when the religion was founded or its sacred texts were written. This process helps an organized religion create an identity for their followers, which distinguishes them from those who belong to other or no faiths. However, this process in itself runs counter to the thrust of moral reasoning which provides behavior guidelines that apply to everyone universally.
Assuming that religious rules are automatically synonymous with moral requirements leads to confusion, and can make morality seem unduly restrictive, regressive, and puritanical. Think of Iran’s moral police. Although any religion is free to so prohibit certain actions within their own faith community, these prohibitions do not necessarily rise to the level of a moral requirement applicable to all human beings. That requires argumentation whose cogency is agreed upon by at least a preponderance of moralists, ethicists, and others exercising thought independent of religious assumptions and beliefs, interpretations of biblical or sacred texts, or philosophical and cultural assumptions specific to (a) religion. Moreover, certain religious beliefs such as we are all children of God or there is that of God in all of us, or concepts like the brotherhood of mankind and equality of all before God, profoundly reinforce the principle of respect for (all) others, the foundation stone of moral obligation. Then too, religions at their best tend to help their followers focus on what has enduring value as opposed to immediate self-gratification, encouraging them to look at things through the eyes of God as a moral exemplar, serve a purpose larger than themselves, and practice virtues that make them able to become productive, contributing members of their community and society.
Assuming that religious rules are automatically synonymous with moral requirements leads to confusion, and can make morality seem unduly restrictive, regressive, and puritanical. Think of Iran’s moral police.
Two religious prescriptions, wrongly claimed to have universal applicability, have become political hot-button items. First, prohibitions against same sex relations or marriage. Such relations have of course existed through history; but in the face of cultural objections, they have often tended to remain clandestine. Some religions consider these actions wrong; others do not. Justifications for their wrongness, such as they are, have relied on interpretations of the biblical Sodom and Gomorrah story and vague notions of such relations being unnatural, notions at least in part prompted by cultural norms and assumptions which in themselves are no sure guide to what is legitimately moral—they certainly won’t in the case of slavery, for example. In any case, there is nothing that can be construed as immoral about such relations when viewed in terms of our previous discussion of the essentials of the moral dimension.
Morality would be an issue if, for example, abuse, disloyalty, or deception occurred in the relationship, but so would those also be issues in heterosexual relations. However, regardless of the views of a particular religion, abuse and discrimination against those who are in such relationships is immoral, even for those who believe it is wrong, a point Pope Francis has been making for years.
Abortion, of course, is the second prominent hot-button item. Although there are more moral issues surrounding abortion, its prohibition is not something all religions agree on, or even all branches of the same religion. In the next section we shall see that Evangelicals did not oppose abortion until five years after Roe v Wade, and then mainly because the issue become linked to Republican Party efforts to recruit them.
On the other hand, abortion has been a Catholic issue, although it was not until the middle of the 19th century that the Church considered abortion murder before quickening occurs, around 16 to 20 weeks into pregnancy. Its opposition to abortion rested in part on the idea that sex exists exclusively for purposes of procreation (only very recently did the Catholic Church recognize other purposes such as pleasure). Ultimately, its philosophical justification for opposition to abortion is grounded in a Natural Law theory developed by Thomas Aquinas, a Dominican priest and philosopher of the 13th century. Theories appealing to various notions of nature are in themselves quite controversial philosophically. In any case, the absence of a justification for prohibiting abortion that convinces moralists and ethicists across the board is why such prohibition does not reach the level of a moral requirement applicable to all. And the idea that life begins at conception is not a scientific statement; and suggestions that abortion of a fetus is equivalent to the criminal and immoral action of going across the street and arbitrarily gunning down your neighbor’s child just seem intuitively wrong. On the other hand, late-term abortions or abortions after embryo could reasonably be said to survive outside the womb do raise moral issues unless under extenuating circumstances.
I recognize that this questioning of the universal applicability of these current hot-button prohibitions may be difficult for some even to consider. But perhaps it will help to use a different example, one that does not currently engender such passionate opinions and emotion: the belief of the Society of Friends (Quakers) in the rightness of pacifism and the wrongness of war and violence. Here is what its original founders wrote: “That spirit of Christ by which we are guided is not changeable….and so testify to the world, that the spirit of Christ, which leads us into all Truth, will never move us to fight and war against any man with outward weapons, neither for the kingdom of Christ, nor for the kingdoms of this world.” Quakers have continued to abide by their religious principle of pacifism throughout their entire history, and believe it is the right course of action. While they encourage others to share that belief, they have never suggested that they had a right to impose it as a moral requirement on non-Quakers. Moreover, they recognize that even for Quakers, individual conscience is the final criterion for action; and so, some Quakers did, for example, serve in the army during World War II. I would suggest religions should treat abortion and same-sex relations or marriage in the same way Quakers treat their opposition to war and violence. I would also suggest consideration of the fact that Catholic countries like Ireland, Italy, Argentina, and Mexico permit abortions.
Unfortunately, religions do not customarily worry themselves about which of their do’s and don’ts reach the level of a universal moral requirement. Then, too, many of them believe they have a direct line to absolute truth, insofar as their scriptures or founders are linked to the divine realm. Historically this belief in having the absolute truth has generated wars between competing faiths and justified theocracies.
More to our contemporary concern, religions have too often wrongly positioned themselves to dictate to society at large prohibitions against actions they consider wrongful, but others do not. Ordinarily that can only be attempted by the dominant religion in a society, and this effort in a democracy requires getting sufficient voters to approve or finding a way to circumvent the will of voters who disagree, or if in an authoritarian regime, getting the ruler(s) to sanction its beliefs. The situation we are facing is the former, and the alliance between the Republican Party and the Religious Right, with its distortion of morality and its failure to maintain boundaries between religion and politics, will be the topic of the next section. (See Part II.)